Persuasion in Complex Games by Guhe, M. & Lascarides, A.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Persuasion in Complex Games
Citation for published version:
Guhe, M & Lascarides, A 2014, Persuasion in Complex Games. in Proceedings of the 18th Workshop on
the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (SEMDIAL). pp. 62-70.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Proceedings of the 18th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (SEMDIAL)
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Persuasion in Complex Games
Markus Guhe, Alex Lascarides
University of Edinburgh, School of Informatics
Informatics Forum, 10 Crichton St
Edinburgh EH8 9AB, Scotland
m.guhe@ed.ac.uk, alex@inf.ed.a.uk
Abstract
We study the power of persuasion in a
game where each player’s own preferences
over the negotiation’s outcomes are dy-
namic and uncertain. Our empirical set up
supports evaluating individual aspects of
the persuasion and reaction strategies in
controlled ways. We show how this gen-
eral method gives rise to domain-specific
conclusions, in our case for The Settlers
of Catan: e.g., the less scope there is for
persuading during the game, the more one
must ensure one gains an immediate bene-
fit from it beyond the desired trade.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study persuasion in a non-
cooperative setting, which Gricean (1975) maxims
don’t account for (Asher and Lascarides, 2013).
Within game theory, standard negotiation models
ascribe each player complete and static knowl-
edge of his own (intrinsic) preferences over the
negotiation’s outcomes (e.g., Binmore (1998)). So
the associated models of persuasion focus only on
the persuader manipulating his opponents’ beliefs
about which outcomes are likely (e.g., Rubinstein
(2007)). For instance, during trading, the receiver
of an offer to exchange wheat for clay might de-
clare he has no wheat, and indeed be lying, so as
to persuade his opponent to accept his counteroffer
of ore for clay.
But if trading is a fraction of the action sequence
in a complex game, then a player’s estimates of
which next trade would enhance (or hinder) his
chances to eventually win may be wrong. Persua-
sion then has higher stakes: there’s a new potential
payoff in manipulating an opponent’s preferences
over the next trade, not just his beliefs; but there’s
also a new risk because the persuader’s deficient
perception of the potential benefits of a particu-
lar trade may mean persuading backfires on him.
In addition, the persuader risks revealing informa-
tion about his own intentions or preferences via
the persuasion move.
Studies on manipulating an opponent’s trading
preferences exist in argumentation theory (e.g.,
Amgoud and Vesic (2014)), but these models fo-
cus entirely on the logical structure of success-
ful persuasion moves—i.e., moves where the re-
cipient is persuaded and so changes his behaviour
in the intended way. They don’t consider the per-
suading agent having a false perception of his own
payoffs, and so don’t model the above risk of suc-
cessfully persuading in a complex game.
Persuasion in complex games is commonplace.
While interactions between businesses are often
modelled via Markov Decision Processes, in real-
ity the game tree isn’t surveyable because a player
may make an offer that his opponent didn’t foresee
as a possible move. Similarly, in board games like
Civilisation and The Settlers of Catan (or Settlers)
there are unbounded options for trading due to, for
instance, the capacity to promise a specific future
trade: e.g., I’ll give clay for wheat now and ore
when I get it if you don’t block me. So standard al-
gorithms for computing preferences over the out-
comes of the current negotiation, like backwards
induction and its variants (Shoham and Leyton-
Brown, 2009), break down (Cadilhac et al., 2013).
We therefore need a general method for explor-
ing the benefits and risks of persuasion in contexts
that go beyond the ones modelled in standard ne-
gotiation games or argumentation theory. We sup-
ply a method here, using game simulations among
computer agents whose symbolic strategies differ
in transparent and controlled ways. We identify the
following: when a persuasion move is likely to be
successful (i.e., the recipient is persuaded); when
successful persuasion results in a higher chance
to win the overall game; and conversely when at-
tempts to persuade are ineffective in improving
win rates, even if they’re successful.
Our empirical set up provides a proof by
demonstration that one can rapidly design, test and
adapt symbolic persuasion strategies, with adapta-
tion being guided by the quantitative performance
metrics from game simulations. Specifically, we
use our method to modify an existing agent that
plays Settlers, and the result is a more effective
player. Previous work on automatically learning
Settlers strategies has shown that a decent prior
player is critical for learning to succeed (Szita et
al., 2010; Pfeiffer, 2003). We provide a principled
way to build such priors, but investigating whether
they enhance machine learning is future work.
In section 2 we describe related research, in-
cluding work on agents that play Settlers. In sec-
tion 3 we describe the rules of Settlers and the im-
plemented agents that we use as a starting point.
We then present our experiments, in which we ma-
nipulate the context in which the persuading agent
chooses to perform a persuading move, the type
of persuading move he attempts, and the strate-
gies opponents adopt for accept or rejecting per-
suading moves. We provide quantitative metrics
via game simulations of the effects of their dif-
ferent policies—e.g., their win rates and the num-
ber of persuasion moves executed. Our experi-
ments radically discriminate among the persuasion
strategies, identifying the strong strategies from
the weak ones even though our game lacks any an-
alytic solution.
2 Related Work
Negotiation in game theory (e.g., Binmore (1998),
Brams (2003)) models when and how one suffers
from the ‘winner’s curse’ (i.e., overpaying for an
item, given the opponents’ preferences) and prob-
lems analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., can
one player trust the other to voluntarily cooper-
ate during negotiation). But since each player has
a complete and static model of his own prefer-
ences over the outcomes of negotiation the scope
of persuasion gets restricted to persuading an op-
ponent to change his beliefs but not his preferences
over trades. Consequently game-theoretic models
of persuasion (e.g., Rubinstein and Glazer (2006))
focus on the problem of predicting the credibil-
ity of the persuasive move. We address different
questions: if one isn’t certain about which trades
will help you, or hurt you, for winning the over-
all (complex) game, then how can one balance the
benefits and risks of successfully persuading? And
hence at what stage in a complex game is suc-
cessful persuasion most likely to increase one’s
chances of winning the overall game? We propose
an empirical method for answering these ques-
tions.
Our domain of study is Settlers (see section 3
for motivation). Empirical approaches to mod-
elling Settlers deploy Monte Carlo Tree Search
(Szita et al., 2010; Roelofs, 2012) and reinforce-
ment learning (Pfeiffer, 2003). But even though
they all use a simplified game, with no trading
or negotiating, they all need a decent prior model
for learning to succeed. So their priors encode so-
phisticated strategies, defined via complex hand-
coded heuristics. Our work contributes to the gen-
eral problem of developing decent priors: we sup-
ply an empirical framework where hand-coded
heuristics can be rapidly designed and improved
in light of quantitative performance metrics; e.g.,
Guhe and Lascarides (2013; 2014b) where we (a)
identify negotiation strategies in Settlers that com-
pensate for deficiencies in belief, e.g., memory
loss, and (b) improve the building strategy used by
our agents. Here, we identify effective persuasion
strategies.
In trade negotiations, the persuading agent aims
for either:
1. More Trades: i.e., a desired trade he might
not achieve otherwise (e.g., If you accept this
trade, you’ll get clay and be able to build a
road); or
2. Fewer Opponent Trades: i.e., he stops two
opponents from trading with each other (e.g.,
Don’t trade with him! He’s about to win!)
Kraus and Lehmann (1995) propose hand-built
symbolic strategies for performing both these
kinds of persuasion moves within the complex
game Diplomacy, but the individual aspects of the
strategies aren’t evaluated in controlled and trans-
parent ways. We supply an empirical framework
for doing just that. Here, we focus on game sim-
ulations for testing only those persuasion strate-
gies that aim for More Trades; we address persua-
sion strategies aiming for Fewer Opponent Trades
(FOT) in Guhe and Lascarides (2014a).
Achieving a successful persuasion move—i.e.,
one where the opponent is persuaded—is depen-
dent on the persuading agent’s ability to adapt his
persuasive argument to the current context and his
type of opponent. In a game of imperfect informa-
tion, some executed persuasion moves are unsuc-
cessful; i.e., they fail to persuade. So in this paper
we explore how the persuading agent’s ability—or
inability—to articulate arguments to opponents of
various types should impact on his decisions about
when to execute a persuading move so as to max-
imise his chances of winning the overall game.
3 The Settlers of Catan and JSettlers
The domain for our experiments is the board game
The Settlers of Catan (or Settlers, (Teuber, 1995);
www.catan.com). We chose it for its complex-
ity: it is multi-player, partially observable, non-
deterministic and dynamic; and further, with nego-
tiations being conducted in natural language, the
game’s options are unbounded (see earlier discus-
sion). Thus our experiments prove that one can
rapidly design and improve persuasion strategies
in a principled and empirically grounded way even
when game-theoretic algorithms for optimisation
break down.
Settlers is a win–lose board game for 2 to
4 players. Each player acquires resources (ore,
wood, wheat, clay, sheep) and uses them to build
roads, settlements and cities on a board shown in
Figure 1. This earns Victory Points (VPs); the first
player with 10 VPs wins. Players can acquire re-
sources via the dice roll that starts each turn and
through trading with other players—so they nego-
tiate trades. Players can also lose resources: e.g., a
player who rolls a 7 can rob from another player.
What’s robbed is hidden, so players are uncertain
about their opponents’ resources. Deciding what
resources to trade depends on what you want to
build; e.g., a road requires 1 clay and 1 wood. Be-
cause Settlers is a game of imperfect information,
agents frequently engage in ‘futile’ negotiations
that result in no trade; i.e., they miscalculate the
equilibria (Afantenos et al., 2012).
Our experiments modify an existing Set-
tlers playing environment and automated Settlers
player called JSettlers (jsettlers2, Thomas
(2003)). JSettlers is a client–server system: a
server maintains the game state and passes mes-
sages between the players’ clients, which can run
on different computers. Clients can be humans or
computer agents. Here, we report on simulations
between computer agents.
The JSettlers agent goes through multiple
phases after the dice roll that starts his turn:
Figure 1: A game of Settlers in JSettlers.
1. Deal with game events: e.g. placing the rob-
ber; acquiring or discarding resources.
2. Determine legal and potential places to build.
3. Find the Best Build Plan (BBP), viz. the
agent’s estimate of which build action gets
him to 10 VPs in the shortest estimated time.
4. Try to execute the BBP, including negotiating
and trading with other players.
Since we wish to study persuasion, our agents
vary only in their policies for step 4, cf. section 4.
Thomas (2003) describes steps 1–3. Here it only
matters that the existing decisions on when to trade
mean trading correlates with winning (Guhe and
Lascarides, 2013).
In step 4 all agents have three existing possible
responses to a trade offer: accept, reject or coun-
teroffer. We equip our persuading agent with one
more: to persuade an opponent to accept his trade
offer. In our experiments, we vary the strategy for
choosing among this expanded set of actions, and
the strategies for reacting to the new option.
4 Evaluating Persuasion Moves
4.1 Motivation
There are a whole host of persuasive arguments
that can accompany a trade offer—Settlers doesn’t
restrict the types of trades nor the reasons for trad-
ing in any significant way. A small selection of
possible persuasion moves is:
(1) Give me 1 ore for 1 wheat and you can im-
mediately build a settlement, which you can’t
build without the wheat.
(2) Give me 1 ore for 1 wheat and only then will
you have enough wheat to make a trade with
your 3:1 port.
(3) If you give me 1 ore for 1 wheat, you can use
the wheat to trade for James’ clay, so that you
can build your road.
(4) If you give me 1 ore for 1 wheat, I won’t rob
you the next time I’m playing a knight card.
(5) If you give me 1 ore for 1 wheat, I’ll build a
road that blocks Nick from that port.
So the benefits and risks of persuasion will depend
on (at least):
P’s ingenuity: the range of contexts where the
persuading agent (who we’ll label P) can ar-
ticulate a persuasive move like those in (1) to
(5) and beyond.
P’s caution: In those contexts where his inge-
nuity provides a candidate persuasion move,
P’s strategy for deciding whether to actually
make that move; and
G’s gullibility: how inclined the recipient (la-
belled G) is to accept P’s persuasion move
and hence also the trade offer.
Ingenuity and caution are distinct factors that
determine a persuader’s player type: ingenuity af-
fects the persuader’s range of options (he is more
or less able to generate a candidate persuasion
move); caution affects the persuader’s penchant
for actually executing a persuasion move when
such a move is an option. Our experiments vary
both factors, because the optimal level of cau-
tion may be different for an ingenious vs. non-
ingenious agent—after all, an ingenious cautious
player’s behaviour is not in general equivalent to
that of a non-ingenious, non-cautious player.
Asher and Lascarides (2013) show that a ratio-
nal G will normally accept P’s speech act—and a
persuading move in particular—if G believes P to
be sincere (i.e., P believes what he says) and com-
petent (i.e., what P believes is true). But P can
appear sincere and competent without actually be-
ing so. For instance, P can utter (1) but be igno-
rant about whether G has the other resources he
needs for a settlement (i.e., clay, wood and sheep)
and/or he may lack evidence that building a set-
tlement is better for G than G’s current build plan
(whatever that is). In this case, P is neither sincere
nor competent. But even if G lacks clay, wood and
sheep, it’s still consistent for him to assume that P
was sincere (but inconsistent to assume he’s com-
petent), for G’s resources aren’t observable to P
and P’s beliefs aren’t observable to G. Further, if
G does have clay, wood and sheep, then because
G is uncertain about his own relative preferences
over build plans, it’s consistent for G to assume
that P is both sincere and competent in (1)’s im-
plicated content, that building a settlement is both
possible and better for G. Thus there’s scope for P
to successfully bluff, getting G to accept his per-
suasion move even though he’s neither sincere nor
competent. Our experiments thus investigate when
bluffing succeeds, and whether successfully bluff-
ing helps P win the overall game.
4.2 The Agents’ Contexts
We start with a persuading agent P with max-
imal ingenuity—i.e., he can make a persuasion
move every time he makes a trade offer and is
unrestricted in the number of such moves he can
make in the course of the game. Further, we make
G maximally gullible: he assumes P’s persuasion
move is convincing so long as the proposed trade
is executable. We then vary P’s caution, by mak-
ing P start executing persuasion moves only once
the first agent reaches a specified number of VPs.
We call this factor VP. In Guhe and Lascarides
(2014a) we showed that the timing of persuasion
moves is crucial and moves early and late in the
game are much less effective than if they are used
when the first player has reached around 7 VPs.
We call these agents simple. In terms of Guhe
and Lascarides (2013) these agents are both igno-
rant, in that they use only observable information
(VPs for P , his own resources for G) to decide
what to do. A simple P is also relatively incau-
tious, because the leader’s VPs is the only factor
that prevents P’s trade offer from having an ac-
companying persuasion move too.
From this starting point, we will then vary P’s
degree of caution, by restricting the contexts (over
and above VP) in which P actually chooses to
make a persuasion move, and G’s gullibility by re-
stricting the contexts in which G accepts P’s per-
suasion moves.
4.3 Method for Simulation and Analysis
A simulation for testing the different persuasion
moves consists of 1 persuading agent (P) playing
3 non-persuading opponents (G) in 10,000 games.
So the null hypothesis is that each agent wins 25%
of these 10,000 games. To carry out these simu-
lations, we created a simulation environment for
JSettlers: the server and the 4 agents all run on
the same machine, and 10,000 games take about 1
hour on a current desktop computer.
Apart from the agents’ win rates, we measure
how many persuasion moves P actually makes:
the fewer persuasion moves P needs to gain a sig-
nificant advantage in winning, the more efficient
they are in achieving desirable effects.
We performed Z-tests with p < 0.01 to test sig-
nificance of win rates against the null hypothesis.
This means that win rates between 0.24 and 0.26
don’t differ significantly from the null-hypothesis;
so we highlight the 0.26 threshold in the graphs
below. We report the average numbers for P for
each simulation, and averages across all three of
P’s opponents. Due to the large number of games
per simulation even small differences can be sig-
nificant. At the same time, there were no signifi-
cant differences between the three Gs. Persuasion
does not affect the average length of the game,
which is consistently between 21 and 21.5 rounds.
5 Simple vs. Cautious P
5.1 P:∅ vs. P:PB
In the first set of simulations we compared simple
agents (i.e. agents the make/accept the maximum
number of persuasion moves) and then restricted
P to a more self-serving context:
1. None (∅): P using this context makes a per-
suasion move with every trade offer proviso
the VP factor; G using this context accepts
all persuasion moves and the accompanying
trade offer if the trade is executable (i.e. G
has the resources for making the trade).
2. Persuader Build (PB): P makes the persua-
sion move iff VP is satisfied and the proposed
trade allows him to build immediately, i.e. to
execute his BBP after making the trade.
A P who adopts PB is relatively cautious: he’s at-
tempting to mitigate the risk of his deficient pref-
erences over trades by ensuring that all successful
persuasions result not only in his desired trade but
also in the immediate benefit of building.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results for the
configuration (P:∅, G:∅)—i.e.P can make an un-
limited number of persuasion moves (N=∞) and
G accepts all such moves—as well as for the con-
figuration (P:PB, G:∅). P:PB’s win rates are al-
most as good as P:∅’s (0.363 vs. 0.377 at 2 VPs;
0.274 vs. 0.285 at 8 VPs) but he needs substan-
tially fewer persuasion moves for this (15.4 vs.
40.8 at 2 VPs; 1.4 vs. 6.0 at 8 VPs).
Realistically, a fully ingenious P risks irritating
his opponents and making them suspicious if he
makes a persuasion move every time he can—even
15 moves in the course of a game (cf.P:{PB, VP =
2}) is more than humans do according to our cor-
pus data (Afantenos et al., 2012). Figure 3 shows
what happens if the number of persuasion moves
P can make are limited (P:{N ∈ [1, 3]}, G:∅).
P:PB achieves a significant improvement over the
null-hypothesis even when he only makes 1 move
at most, so long as he makes that move after the
first player reaches 6 VPs. (This is consistent with
our results in Guhe and Lascarides (2014a).) The
less cautious P:∅ needs to be able to make at least
3 moves to gain a significant advantage. The right
graph in Figure 3—depicting the number of moves
P actually made—also shows that even though
P:PB makes fewer moves than P:∅, he achieves a
much higher win rate. So perhaps surprisingly, the
less ingenious P needs to be more cautious.
In the following, we will only report on simu-
lations where P can make an unlimited number
of persuasion moves (i.e., N = ∞), because the
main effect for N is the same across simulations:
the higher N is, the more moves P makes and the
more games he wins.
5.2 Number of gullible agents
An agent’s success is always highly dependent on
his opponents. So we checked how much P’s per-
formance depends on the number of persuadable
opponents he plays against. These simulations
vary the number of G opponents who accept per-
suasion moves vs. those (non-G) opponents who
never accept them. For conditions (P:∅, G:∅)
and for (P:PB, G:∅), P retained a big advantage
over all three opponents even when only one of
them is persuadable. Further, deploying PB helps
P achieve almost the same win rate as without it,
but with fewer than half of the persuasion moves.
wins moves made
config. ∅ PB ∅ PB
3 G 0.383 0.363 40.7 15.4
2 G 0.342 0.341 47.6 19.1
1 G 0.302 0.315 60.3 24.7
The reason why the persuader needs more
moves the fewer opponents are gullible is that
Figure 2: Win rate and persuasion actually moves made, against the VP factor (i.e., the leader’s minimum
VPs before persuading can start). The dashed line is P:∅, the solid line is P:PB.
Figure 3: Win rate and moves made against the VP factor. Dashed lines are P:∅ and solid lines P:PB.
more of the persuader’s trade offers are unsuccess-
ful (non-gullible agents accept offers at a normal
rate). So P has to make more offers to get the
trades he wants.
6 A more discerning G
So far, our G agents are so gullible that they don’t
test the persuasive argument for sincerity or com-
petence. We now restrict G’s gullibility: instead of
accepting all persuasion moves where the trade is
executable (G:∅), we make G accept whatever P’s
persuasive move is only if G can build something
or make a bank/port trade as a result of trading (in
the following we abbreviate trade with the bank or
an available port to bank trade). In other words,
factors for G accepting a persuasion move are:
1. Gullible Build (GB): G accepts the persua-
sion move only if it enables him to build a
type of piece that he cannot build without
making the trade.
2. Gullible Bank Trade (GBT): G accepts the
persuasion move only if after making the
trade he can make a bank trade immediately.
3. GBoBT: The disjunction of these two cases.
Note that G:GB by default assumes that P is sin-
cere and competent on persuasive moves like (1),
and G:GBT by default assumes that P is sincere
and competent on persuasive moves like (2).
Here it is important to distinguish the persua-
sion move from the trade offer that it is accompa-
nying: Even if G does not accept the persuasion
argument (e.g., G infers P’s persuasion argument
is not competent), he will still evaluate the trade
offer in it’s own right. For example, in (1), G may
still agree to exchange 1 ore for 1 wheat, even if
this does not enable him to immediately build the
settlement as P claims. That is, G never rejects
a trade offer with a persuasion move if he would
have accepted it without the persuasion.
Figure 4 gives the results for both P:∅ and
P:PB. In all cases, P fares better in the PB con-
text than in the ∅ one and with fewer persuasion
moves; i.e., P:PB is not only more effective but
Figure 4: Win rate and moves made when varying G’s gullibility. Dashed lines are P:∅; solid lines P:PB.
also more efficient. Indeed, there is no effect for
(P:∅, G:GB)—i.e., no agent gains an advantage—
but there is an effect for (P:PB, G:GB). So as G
gets less gullible, P should get more cautious (i.e.,
play with strategy PB). On the other hand, as we
saw in sections 5.1 and 5.2, so long as at least one
of P’s opponents is maximally gullible (G:∅), P
should be maximally incautious (i.e., P:∅).
For G:GBT, P gains an advantage for both of
his contexts. Thus, the potential benefit for G if P
makes move (2) is smaller than that for move (1);
conversely, P’s risk in successfully making move
(1) is smaller than that for move (2). When G ac-
cepts persuasion attempts of both kinds so long as
it’s consistent with sincerity and competence—i.e.
G:GBoBT—then P has a bigger advantage than if
G uses only one of the contexts, and P needs even
fewer moves. So, one general observation here is
that the more types of persuasion moves G accepts,
the more successful P is and the fewer moves P
needs to achieve this.
7 P taking G’s Context into Account
So far, P does not reason about G’s likely reac-
tion when deciding whether to make a persuasion
move. But as we said earlier, persuasion must ap-
pear sincere and competent to a rational G to be
successful. AndP can reduce the risk of miscalcu-
lating equilibria and making futile moves by rea-
soning about G’s likely reaction. We investigate
this by restricting P’s ingenuity—he can only ar-
ticulate moves of the form (1) or (2)—and P’s
caution in the following ways:
1. Persuader Opponent Build (POB): P only
makes a persuasion move only if he believes
that it allows G to build something that he
cannot build without making the trade.
2. Persuader Opponent Bank Trade (POBT):
P makes the persuasion move only if P be-
lieves that after making the trade, G can im-
mediately make a bank trade that he cannot
make without the trade.
3. POBoOBT: The disjunction of these cases.
Whether P executes a persuasion move now de-
pends on P’s beliefs about G’s resources. For in-
stance, agent P:POB must believe that the re-
sources G gets in the proposed trade are neces-
sary and sufficient for G to immediately build. So
P:POB is in effect only making persuasion moves
of form (1), and executes such a move only if P
believes that a G player of the following type will
accept it: (a) G is rational, and so accepts a move
iff G believes it’s sincere and competent; and (b) G
defaults to believing moves are sincere and com-
petent. Similarly, P:POBT only makes persuasion
moves of the form (2) and only executes them if P
believes a G player of the above type will accept
it; P:POBoOBT is slightly more ingenious, using
persuasion moves of both types.
The agents use the standard JSettlers belief
model, i.e. no memory loss and fully accurate be-
liefs about how many resources each opponent
has, but some are of unknown type because of rob-
bing. In terms of Guhe and Lascarides (2013),P is
relatively cautious: he does not take G’s unknown
resources into account, i.e. he only makes a per-
suasion move, if he knows that G can execute the
build or bank trade he promises—P does not bluff.
Depending on his gullibility configuration, G
accepts different persuasion arguments, e.g. G:GB
is only susceptible to the arguments of P:POB (or,
P:POBoOBT) but not P:POBT.
Similar to the previous result, P:POB does not
improve his win rate but P:{PB, POB} does. And
Figure 5: Win rate and moves made when P takes G’s context into account. Dashed lines are P:∅; solid
lines P:PB.
when being more selective about making persua-
sion moves (by adopting PB), adding POB does
not reduce P’s win rate, but he needs only about a
quarter of the moves.
In the (P:{PB, POBT}, G:GBT) context, P’s
win rate is similar to the one without P taking
G’s context into account. This strategy is more
efficient for P (fewer moves) and more effective
(higher win rate) than POB. Again, the PB context
is more effective and efficient than the ∅ context.
Finally, in (P:{PB, POBoOBT}, G:GBoBT) P
makes both kinds of persuasive moves as well as
both kinds of assessments about G’s state, and G
is selective about both types of moves. The added
opportunities that P obtains through his increased
ingenuity compared to an agent who can make
only one type of argument leads to more persua-
sive moves being executed and a higher win rate.
Comparing these results to the simulations
when P does not take G’s gullibility into account,
we again see that P can increase its efficiency (he
makes fewer moves) without sacrificing his effec-
tiveness (the win rates do not differ substantially).
8 Conclusions
In this paper we used The Settlers of Catan to
investigate the power of persuasion in a multi-
player, partially observable, non-deterministic, dy-
namic, unbounded game. We established an em-
pirical method involving game simulations, with
the heuristics that the persuading agent and his
recipients use being evaluated in controlled ways
and improved upon.
We found that the more ingenuity the persuader
has at articulating persuasive arguments, and the
more gullible his recipients, the more successful
he becomes at winning the overall game. Indeed,
one gullible agent is sufficient for the persuader
to gain an advantage over all three opponents. If
he lacks ingenuity and so is restricted to only cer-
tain kinds of arguments, then it helps to make per-
forming a persuasive move dependent on whether
the proposed trade will enable him to immediately
build. The persuader can also increase the propor-
tion of his persuasion moves that are successful
without harming his win rate by reasoning about
how his opponent will react.
Gullible agents, who assume the persuader is
sincere and competent by default, cannot improve
over the null-hypothesis—a 25% win-rate. But
they ‘lose less’ if they are selective about the
persuasion moves they comply with; here, if you
comply with just one kind of persuasion move, it
should be the one like (1) (i.e., you can immediate
build but only if you execute the proposed trade).
We are currently collecting data on how persua-
sive human opponents find the More Trade per-
suasion moves we investigated here and will then
investigate persuasion that aims for Fewer Oppo-
nent Trades. We will then use our Settlers envi-
ronment to test our best persuasive agents against
humans. We will also investigate the impact of our
improved priors on automatically learning Settlers
strategies and opponent modelling similar to the
work by Gal et al. (2004) in order to adapt to hu-
man opponents over the course of a game.
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